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APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CORRELATIVE RIGHTS
BY THE STATE CONSERVATION AGENCY IN THE ABSENCE
OF EXPRESS STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.
One objective of conservation legislation is to adjust conflicting
private and public interests in our natural resources so that both may be
adequately protected.' Largely because of their peculiar physical charac-
teristics, this adjustment has been particularly difficult in the area of oil
and gas. Unlike solid minerals, oil and gas are fugacious or they tend to
migrate from areas of high pressure to areas of low pressure.2 This
characteristic is very important to the oil and gas producer, because crea-
tion of low pressure areas by drilling wells is the primary means of
recovery. Migration is significant in another way. The owner 3 of land
overlying an oil and gas pool is unable to enforce a legal claim to any
physically identifiable portion of the minerals.4 Thus, it is possible for
an adjoining landowner over a common source of supply to take all the
oil and gas from beneath his neighbor's land.
To the characteristic of migration must be added that of irreplace-
ability. Unlike underground water, petroleum does not replenish itself.
It has taken millions of years to produce the supply now known to exist.5
Consequently the scarcity and the present high demand for these min-
erals make their production a highly competitive industry. One of the
problems, then, has been to determine the nature of the legally protected
interest in these minerals. The other problem has been to balance that
interest with the interest of the public in preserving oil and gas as a
natural resource so that the greatest ultimate economic recovery may be
realized. 6
The term "correlative rights" may be said to encompass the land-
owner's legally protected interest in the oil and gas beneath his prop-
'AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING AND METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS, PETROLEUM CON-
SERVATION, 6, 7 (1951). Fundamentally, the interests of the profit motivated petro-
leum industry and those of the public are not in conflict. Both are advanced when
measures insuring the greatest ultimate economic recovery of the oil and gas are pro-
mulgated. See also, Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARv. L. IREV. 1209, 1218
(1937-38).
2See generally 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 4 (2d. ed. 1954) and SULLIVAN, OIL AND
GAS LAW § 7 (1955).
'In this paper the word "landowner" or "owner" will include all those people who
have a legal right to reduce to possession the oil and gas beneath a given piece of
land.
'SULLIVAN, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 9.
'Andrews, The Correlative Rights Doctrine in the Law of Oil and Gas, 13 So. CAL. L.
REV. 185, 193 (1939-40); SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 86, 88(1960); and SULLIVAN, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 3, at 7. "The crude oil being pro-
duced today was formed between 1,000,000 and 350,000,000 years ago."
'Summers, The Modern Theory and Practical Application of Statutes for the Conser-
vation of ORl and Gas, 13 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1938-39). " [T]he legal relations of
a landowner respecting oil and gas should be such as to encourage their production
and consumption, but at the same time safeguard the interest of the public against
loss of their economic values through wastful production methods, and afford some
proportionate adjustment of these values between the owners in a common source of
supply. ''
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erty. Since the existence of any right is concomitant to the means avail-
able to enforce it, the objective of this paper is to examine the statutory
means of enforcing correlative rights. Moreover, primary emphasis will
be placed on the protection of such rights in the face of a statute ex-
pressly denying the oil and gas conservation agency the authority to
protect them. This is the problem found in Montana's oil and gas con-
servation legislation,8 and it provides the basis for this paper. Necessarily
incident to this examination will be an analysis of the legal basis for state
regulation of oil and gas.
When oil and gas were first produced, the courts turned to the com-
mon law concepts of real property in settling all questions of ownership.9
Probably one reason for adopting this course rather than one designed to
deal with the peculiar physical characteristics of oil and gas was a lack
of scientific knowledge. Another reason was the abundance of analogous
substances already dealt with by real property law which made it easy
for the courts to find precedent for their decisions. But decisions by
'Definitions of correlative rights are extensive. For examples of textual definitions
see, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, 17TH OIL AND GAS INSTITUTE 217, 225 (1966).
'The term 'correlative rights' is simply a term to describe . . . reciprocal rights and
duties of the owners in a common source of supply." Summers, Legal Rights Against
Drainage of Oil and Gas, 18 TEXAS L. REV. 27, 32 (1939-40). "Correlative rights is
a convenient term to indicate that adjoining landowners in the exercise of legal
privileges of user of land have mutual correlative right-duty relations with each other
respecting tie oil and gas and other component parts of the land." Kellam, A Cen-
tury of Correlative Rights, 12 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 5 (1960). "It is probably better to
think of them (correlative rights) positively as reciprocal legal relationships per-
taining to the privilege to acquire and the ownership of property.", and SULLIVAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 145. "' [C]orrelative rights means that the privileges of each
landowner in a common source of supply are limited by the duties to the other owners
therein, not to injure the reservoir nor to take an undue proportion of the oil and
gas found therein, nor to commit waste in the production thereof."
Judicial definitions are typified by Kingwood Oil Company v. Hall-Jones Oil
Corporation, 396 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1964) "The term 'correlative rights' embraces
the relative rights of owners in a common source of supply to take oil or gas by legal
operations limited by duties to the other owners (1) not to injure the common source
of supply and (2) not to take an undue proportion of the oil and gas.'' Alphonzo E.
Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 137 Cal. 333, 76 P.2d 167, 174 (1938). "' [C]or-
relative rights is . . . the right of each individual surface owner to take from the oil
strata lying beneath his properties oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons intercepted by
wells sunk beneath his own property, in such a manner as not to commit waste."
Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209, 210 (1900), which was the first
judicial recognition of correlative rights. '" [T]here is a coequal right in them all to
take from a common source of supply, the two substances which in the nature of
things are united, though separate.''
Statutory definitions of correlative rights are generally worded in terms of what is
to be accomplished. 17TH OIL & GAS INST., op. cit. supra note 7, at 225-26.
"I'Montana is the only state we can find that produces substantial quantities of oil and
gas, has a modernized Conservation Act, and belongs to the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission, but has no specific reference to correlative or private rights in the legis-
lation.' Pattie v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 145 Mont. 531, 402 P.2d
596, 599 (1965).
'See Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198 (1879) ; Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 Atl.
714 (1893) ; Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. Rep. 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1897); and
Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372, 207 Pac. 993, 24 A.L.R. 294 (1922). The
Montana case is an example of the extremes some courts went to in this early period.
A waste statute prohibiting the production of carbon black was struck down as being
an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation. The court cited Black-
stone's maxim "Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelun" (the owner of the realty
owns not just the surface, but everything over and under it as well), and concluded
that the state has no legal interest in natural gas after it has been reduced to posses-
sion.
[Vol. 28
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analogy also created problems. The biggest problem was the dilemma
caused by saying a landowner had absolute title to the minerals beneath
his land and yet recognizing that title did not follow the petroleum if it
should migrate to a neighbor's well. 10 In spite of the difficulties, there
developed during this period of time three separate theories of owner-
ship.
The ownership in place theory analogized oil and gas to solid min-
erals." The analogy was supported by a number of similarities, the prin-
cipal one being the fdct that oil and gas were subsurface minerals.'
2
The nonownership theory compared oil and gas to animals ferae naturae.13
Petroleum, because of its fugacious nature, was said to wander about at
will like a wild animal. The third theory was known as the qualified
ownership theory and it was based on water law. 14 Its adherents noted
that both water and oil and gas moved in subterranean channels.15
Whether these three theories of ownership could be reconciled was
a question the courts did not have to decide. For no matter which theory
a particular court might use, the result was always the same.' 6 Or, re-
gardless of what point in time ownership was said to attach, only when
the oil and gas were captured did such ownership become meaningful.
Thus, the legally protected interest in oil and gas in situ became each
landowner's right of appropriation. And this right eventually became
a rule of law known as the rule of capture.1
7
1"17TH OIL AND GAS INST., op. cit. supra note 7, at 218-21.
"Stoughton, supra note 9, at 201. '' [I]t is like coal or any other natural product which
in situ forms part of the land." See other cases in note 9 for similar reasoning.
"The theories of ownership of oil and gas utilized by the various states are examined
in SUMMERS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 61. Montana is apparently an ownership in place
state. See Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, supra note 9; Williard v. Federal Surety Co.,
91 Mont. 465, 8 P.2d 633 (1932), and Stokes v. Tutvet, 134 Mont. 250, 328 P.2d 1096
(1958).
"The classic statement of this position is in Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v.
De Witt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724, 725, 5 L.R.A. 731 (1889).
Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves,
if the analogy be not too fanciful, as mineral ferae naturae. In common
with animals and unlike other minerals, they have the power and the ten-
dency to escape without the volition of the owner . . . . They belong to
the owner of the land, and are a part of it, so long as they are on or in it,
and are subject to his control; but when they escape, and go into other
land, or dome under another 's control, the title of the former owner is gone.
"See Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 142 (1875); and Manufacturers Gas and Oil Co. v.
Indiana Gas and Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912, 50 L.R.A. 768 (1900).
15It has been argued that the theory of correlative rights began in water law. "In
that branch of the law . . . the rule has been developed . . . that owners of land
overlying an underground lake or artesian water belt have reciprocal and correlative
rights to the reasonable use of the waters percolating or lying beneath them." An-
drews, supra note 5, at 193. ''Reasonable use" is defined in Katz v. Wilkinshaw,
141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663 (1902); and Ex parte Elama, 6 Cal. App. 233, 91 Pac. 811
(1907).
"6This peculiar situation is aptly characterized in SUMMERS, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 61.
''When reasons so diverse result in the same conclusion, two situations become ap-
parent, one, that there is error in some of the assigned reasons, and the other, that
the real reasons for the decisions were not disclosed in the opinions."
"7The alternatives to the rule of capture were no better than the rule itself. One
alternative was to recognize absolute ownership in the oil and gas in situ. But if this
were accepted, then any migration of the minerals would be enjoinable. Or if each
owner over a common supply was to be guaranteed a proportionate share of the
1967]
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The rule of capture was a rule of convenience. It was a substitute
for the court's inability to determine accurately the source of oil and gas
after it had been produced. Essentially the rule gave each landowner
the absolute right to reduce to possession by any means, all the oil and
gas beneath his property, and once the substances have been appropriated,
absolute title vested in the possessor regardless of their source."i
A necessary corollary to the rule of capture was the offset drilling
rule. 19 If every landowner had the unlimited right to drill for oil and
gas, then the only way to prevent drainage was to drill enough wells to
counter the wells on adjoining lands. Therefore, any drainage caused by
a failure to drill offset wells left the aggrieved party without a remedy.
He could not prove that the oil and gas captured by his neighbor were his
property. Because of the importance of the right to drill offset wells, no
owner could deprive another of this right.20
The immediate result of the two rules was unlimited production.
For every landowner exercising his right to capture, there was another
drilling offset wells. Soon only the quantity of petroleum produced was
important. The unfettered competition had no place for prudent means
of production. Perhaps the emphasis on production at the expense of
conservation was justifiable at a period of time when the petroleum sup-
ply was undeveloped. For when supply seems unlimited and demand
small, there is very little reason to worry about overproduction and
waste .
2 1
However, as oil and gas became important to both private and pub-
lic interests as a valuable irreplaceable natural resource, several adverse
effects of the rules of capture and offset drilling became obvious. 22
First, the landowner was incurring great expense by drilling useless
wells. He not only had to drill enough wells to get maximum production
from his land, but also had to counter the drilling of his neighbor. Execs-
minerals, the only practical way of determining what this share would be is to allow
each owner "uninhibited competitive operations." Thus, you would be back to the rule
of capture. 17TH OIL AND GAS INST., op. Cit. supra note 7 at 221.
IsHardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implication as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13
TEXAS L. REV. 391 (1934-35). This meant that a landowner could drill an unlimited
number of wells on his land. Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296,
83 S.W.2d 935, 940, 99 A.L.R. 1107 (1935). He could drill them at any place he
desired. Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., supra note 9. And the captured product could be used
by the producer in any way he saw fit. Gas Products Co. v. Ranikin, supra note 9.
In many cases the rule of capture had the effect of giving legal sanction to waste
and deliberate destruction of oil and gas reservoirs by neighboring landowners. See
Louisiana Gas and Fuel Co. v. White Bros., 157 La. 728, 103 So. 23 (1925); McCoy v.
Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383 (1932), alf'd, 184 La. 487, 165
So. 632 (1936) ; and Hague v. Wheeler, supra note 9.
"9Hardwicke, supra note 18, at 393.
:'Ross v. Damm, 278 Mich. 388, 270 N.W. 722 (1936).
'One explanation advanced for early encouragement of unlimited production was that
the courts were interested primarily in the immediate economic utility of the oil
and gas. Therefore, rules of law were needed to encourage production so that the oil
and gas could be sold on the market. The rules of catpure and offset drilling aptly
fulfilled this desire. See Summers, supra note 6, at 7-8.
' -Andrews, supra note 5, at 194.
[Vol. 28
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sive drilling also had the effect of reducing the ultimate recovery pos-
sible from a common supply. Before modern methods of secondary re-
covery, effective production of oil and gas was dependent on sustained
high pressure within the reservoir. The excessive number of wells caused
unnecessary loss of reservoir energy. This was largely the result of the
unrestricted waste of natural gas. Overproduction also kept the oil and
gas market unstable. In two states, the market price became so low that
martial law was declared and all oil sales were prohibited until remedial
legislation to curb oversupply and waste could be enacted.23 Clearly
neither the public nor the private oil producer was benefiting from the
unlimited application of the rules of capture and offset drilling. To pro-
tect both interests, it would be necessary to limit these rules, and con-
servation legislation seemed to be the only answer.
The need for conservation legislation was obvious, but a legal basis
for such legislation was not so evident. The Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution forbids the taking of private property
without due process of law. Under the rule of capture, each landowner's
right to drill was a property interest. But because of the importance of
oil and gas as a natural resource, the private property interests in these
resources could not be absolute. And now the state's power to formulate
reasonable conservation measures under its police powers is undisputed.
The rule of capture had to bend to the superior right of the state.24
Three theories upon which to base the power were available-nuis-
ance law, prevention of waste, and protection of correlative rights. The
common law method for controlling the excesses of oil and gas produc-
tion was found in nuisance law.25 Before the recognition of correlative
rights, and aside from the right to drill offset wells, an action for the
abatement of a nuisance was the only legal remedy an oil producer had
against the wasteful operations of his neighbor. The typical instance
arose when the defendant producer conducted his operations in such a
manner that his neighbor's property was injured. 2 But this would have
been a very unsatisfactory basis for conservation legislation, since the
greatest evils to be prevented occurred beneath the surface of the land.
'Haglund, The New Conservation Movement with Respect to Petroleum and Natural
Gas, 22 Ky. L. J. 543 (1933-34).
242 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1319-20 (8th ed. 1927).
'See for example Commanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pac. Coal and Oil Co., 298 S.W.
554, (Tex. Com. App. 1927); reversing 274 S.W. 193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). Defend-
ant had used nitroglycerin in his drilling operations and it injured plaintiff's well,
which was located on adjoining property. In Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Gregg, 337
S.W.2d 216, (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), aff'd, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961), sand fracturing
of a well was enjoined because it caused gas flow from plaintiff's to defendant's
property to increase.
For a general survey of the remedies available to the individual landowner see
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 198 (1949).
'Is nuisance law the real basis for the existence of correlative rights? Everyone has a
duty to use his property in such a way that his neighbor will not be injured. There-
fore, a petroleum producer could not drill in such a manner as to cause the reservoir
under his neighbor's land to be injured. More specifically reservoir energy could not
be wasted, nor an inequitable share of the oil and gas taken. In other words, one
producer could not interfere with another's right to drill for the minerals on his
land. This was argued by Summers, supra note 6, at 12-13.
1967]
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It would be extremely difficult to prove that a producer's operations
were causing damage to the common source of supply particularly when
the rule of capture permitted each producer to drill in any manner he
saw fit.27
A better basis, and one that is utilized by every major oil and gas
producing state today, is that of waste prevention. 28 The theory is that
oil and gas are a natural resource in which the public has an interest.
This collective interest is greater than that of any individual landowner. 9
Consequently, the state may make reasonable regulations designed to
promote the "greatest ultimate economic recovery of the oil and gas from
the earth.'3 0 The result is not a hoarding of the oil and gas in place, but
rather a regulation of production. In this way each landowner was guar-
anteed the opportunity to capture all the oil and gas beneath his prop-
erty, subject to reasonable conservation regulations.3 1 Or, in other words,
prolutinn wn still nlimited as long as waste was not committed.
3 2
Waste statutes performed another function.33 By limiting production
to prevent waste it also became necessary to allocate the allowable pro-
duction among the producers. The waste statutes did not purport to
abolish the rule of capture. Every landowner over a common source no
matter how small his holdings, still had the right to drill for some por-
'United Carbon Co. v. Campbellsville Gas Co., 230 Ky. 275, 18 S.W.2d 1110 (1929).
Use of a compressor was permitted even though it caused a neighboring well to dry
up. In Higgins Oil and Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919),
the court not only sustained plaintiff's right to use a pump in his drilling operations,
but said, ''So far as artificiality is concerned, we do not see the difference between a
well and a pump; both are artificial .. .
"SULLIVAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 149.
'Cases affirming the constitutionality of waste legislation include: Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210 (1932). The statute prohibited eco-
nomic, underground and surface waste, and waste incident to production in excess of
transportation or marketing facilities; Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas
Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950), affirmed conservation agency orders setting minimum
prices for natural gas and requiring a pipe line company to take gas ratably from
the producers at that price; C. C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okla.
237, 292 Pac. 841, 844 (1930). After sustaining conservation agency orders preventing
waste the court said, "Notwithstanding the magnitude and importance of the oil
industry, it is one of the natural resources which is peculiarly susceptible to waste and
dissipation, and when it once escapes can never be recovered." The case of People v.
Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 Pac. 717 (1930) upheld a statute preventing "un-
reasonable waste" as not being too vague a standard.
"SULLIVAN, op. cit. supra note 2 at § 135.
"1See Patterson v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938), appeal
denied 305 U.S. 376 (1939), where the provisions in a mineral deed were limited by a
waste prevention order; Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558,
562 (1948), which allowed a producer to use any legitimate means to capture the oil
and gas beneath his property as long as he does it "within the spirit and purposes of
[the] conservation statutes . . .... ; and Delatte v. Woods, 232 La. 341, 94 So.2d 281,
287 (1957), which stated that conservation legislation must be interpreted with due
regard to public and private interests, but the latter must always yield to a proper
exercise of the state's police power.
3For some of the complications surrounding the application of conservation statutes,
see Davis, Judicial Emasculation of Administrative Action and Oil Production: An-
other View, 19 TEXAS L. R.v. 29 (1940-41), and Summers, Does the Regulation of Oil
Production Require the Denial of Due Process and Equal Protection of the Laws?,
19 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1940-41).
3"AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING AND METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS, op. cit. supra note
1, at 252. Under a waste prevention statute, the protection of correlative rights is a
secondary function.
[Vol. 28
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tion of the oil and gas beneath his property. The waste statutes only pro-
vided that in exercising his right to capture, a producer owed a duty to
the public to operate in a non-wasteful manner. Therefore, as long as
the producer conducted his operations in an approved manner, the state
guaranteed him the opportunity to capture a measurable amount of oil
and gas. However, like the rule of capture, the waste statutes did not
create a property interest in the minerals while they were in situ. If a
producer did not choose to exercise his right to drill, then he could not
complain if the oil and gas beneath his property migrated to his neigh-
bor's property.34
A common method of protecting private rights under a waste statute
is the provision for granting exceptions to well spacing units. For ex-
ample, Montana's statute provides that one well shall be drilled per unit
"with such exception as may be reasonably necessary where it is shown
. . that the spacing unit is located on the edge of a pool or field and
adjacent to a producing unit, or, for some other reason the requirement
to drill the well at the authorized location in the spacing unit would be
inequitable or unreasonable. '35 Another method is to include the protec-
tion of correlative rights within the definition of waste. Illustrative is
the Arkansas statute which provides that waste includes "(a)buse of the
correlative rights and opportunities of each owner of oil and gas in a
common reservoir due to nonuniform, disproportionate, and unratable
withdrawals causing undue drainage between tracts of land.
'3 6
Judicial recognition of correlative rights as a basis for sustaining
conservation legislation was given in the case of Ohio Oil Company v.
Indiana.37 The cause of the litigation was a statute which prohibited the
uncontrolled escape of oil and gas from producing wells. 38 The statute
was challenged on the ground that it deprived plaintiff of his property
without due process of law. In answer to this argument the United States
Supreme Court said there was no property interest in oil and gas while
it was in its natural state. Refuting first the cases which analogized the
property interest in oil and gas to that of solid minerals, the Court said
that not only did oil and gas migrate, but even more importantly, drilling
by one owner diminished the supply available to his neighbors. Conse-
quently, there could be no absolute property interest in the oil and gas
in place, and legislation prohibiting waste of the minerals in situ was
not a taking of property.39
"These restrictions "do not . . . positively prohibit an owner from taking an undue
proportion of the oil and gas in a common source of supply." Summers, supra note
6, at 15.
"REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 60-129(C). REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are
hereinafter cited as R.C.M.
"ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-109(3) (1947). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-6-3
(12)(d) (1963); FLA. STAT. § 377.19(10)(k) (1965); MISS. CODE ANN. § 6132-
08(k) (3) (1942); and NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-902(1)(c) (1943).
-7177 U.S. 190 (1900).
1SJd. at 190-191.
"Id. at 211.
19671
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Neither were oil and gas entirely like animals ferae naturae. The
court recognized that both might move and neither could be owned until
they were appropriated. But the analogy broke down when the question
of regulation arose. There was no question that any state government
could prohibit absolutely the appropriation of wild animals.
On the other hand, as to gas and oil, the surface proprietors with-
in the gas field all have the right to reduce to possession the gas
and oil beneath. They could not be absolutely deprived of this right
which belongs to them without a taking of private property. But
there is a coequal right in them all to take from a common source of
supply, the two substances which in the nature of things are
united, though separate. It follows from the essence of their right
and from the situation of the things, as to which it can be exerted,
that the use by one of his power to seek to convert a part of the com-
mon fund to actual possession may result in an undue proportion
being attributed to one of the possessors of the right, to the detri-
ment of the others, or by waste by one or more, to the annihilation
of the rights of the remainder. Hence it is that the legislative power,
from the peculiar nature of the right and the objects upon which it
is to be exerted, can be manifested for the purpose of protecting all
the collective owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from
the enjoyment by them, of their privilege to reduce to possession,
and to reach the like end by preventing waste.40
The concept of correlative rights is essentially a recognition that
each landowner over a common source of supply is subject to a mutual
right-duty relationship.41 His rights are those guaranteed by the rule of
capture. The right to claim as property all the oil and gas that can be
appropriated beneath one's land is still fundamental. But the landowner
also has duties. Under the waste prevention statutes the primary duty
consisted of preserving for the public valuable natural resources by pro-
hibiting wasteful operations. Under the correlative rights approach the
duty is owed to the adjoining landowners. The difference is attributable
to the emphasis placed on ownership. Where waste prevention statutes
emphasize the public interest over private ownership, the correlative
rights approach recognizes that co-ownership between private interests is
the crucial relationship. 42 If all the owners over a common supply have
a co-equal right to take from a common source, then it is within the
power of the state to protect it. For if one owner could appropriate all
the oil and gas in a particular reservoir, then the adjoining owner's right
to capture would be meaningless.4 3 Therefore, the state may make any
law reasonably designed to insure each landowner a fair opportunity to
appropriate the oil and gas beneath his land.44
"Id. at 209-210.
"See definitions supra note 7.
2Of course, any valid conservation regulation will prevail over inconsistent private
interests. See Denver Producing and Refining Co. v. State, 199 Okla. 171, 184
P.2d 961 (1947); and Application of Champlin Refining Co., 296 P.2d 176 (Okla.
1956).
"Even in the absence of a statute correlative rights have been recognized. Manufac-
turer's Gas and Oil Co. v. Indiana Gas and Oil Co., supra note 14; Louisville Gas Co.
v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 368 (1903), and 132 Ky. 435, 111
S.W. 374 (1908); Higgins Oil and Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., supra note 27; and
Marrs v. City of Oxford, 32 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1929).
"Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra note 37; Commonwealth v. Trent, 117 Ky. 34, 77 S.W.
390 (1903); C. C. Julian Oil and Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, supra note 29; People v.
[Vol. 28
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Statutory protection of correlative rights is accomplished in a va-
riety of ways. In some states it is made a matter of public policy and
the conservation agency is guided by statutory definitions of these
rights.45 Other states do not explicitly define correlative rights, but do
require each producer to be guaranteed his just and equitable share.46
The emphasis placed on and the method used in protecting correlative
rights depends on whether the conservation legislation is primarily for
the protection of these rights or for the preservation of oil and gas as a
natural resource.
47
Oil and gas conservation efforts have a long history in Montana. As
early as 1917, modest efforts were made to control wasteful production
methods. However, receptiveness to comprehensive conservation legisla-
tion was lacking and in both 1937 and 1947, proposed modifications or re-
placement of existing laws were struck down.48 It was not until 1953
that Montana's present comprehensive oil and gas statute was enacted.
One reason for its acceptance at that time was because it was patterned
after a statute proposed by the Interstate Oil Compact Commission. 49
But the Montana law also made significant departures from the model
statute, one of which was the failure to provide for the protection of
Associated Oil Co., supra note 29; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct., 284 U.S. 8
(1931); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., supra note 31 and Ex parte Wood,
34 Cal. App.2d 546, 93 P.2d 1058 (1939).
'COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-6-22 (1963).
It is hereby declared to be in the public interest to foster, encourage and
promote the development, production and utilization of the natural re-
sources of oil and gas . . . and to protect the public and private interests
against the evils of waste . . . to safeguard, protect and enforce the
coequal and correlative rights of owners and producers in a common
source ....
And § 100-6-3(13) defines the term "correlative rights" as meaning "that each
owner and producer in a common pool or source of supply of oil and gas shall have
an equal opportunity to obtain and produce his just and equitable share of the oil
and gas underlying such pool or source of supply."
See also ALA. CODE tit. 18, § 179(24) (1958) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-101 (1947);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-502 (1956); FLA. STAT. § 377.056 (1961); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 353.00 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 6132-01 (1953); NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-901
(1943); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 70 (Cum. Supp. 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-01
(1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 86.3 (1941); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6008 (1962); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-1 (1953).
Another group of states ommitting the policy declaration, but giving a compre-
hensive definition of correlative rights and then requiring the conservation agency
to consider them in making well spacing orders, pooling arrangements unitization
etc. include ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.170(2) (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-3-29
(1953); NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.020 (1963); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1509.01 (Supp.
1965); and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58 § 402 (1964).
'ILA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.9 (D) (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.139(13) 1958);
and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 259.100 (Cumm. Pamphlet, Aug. 1966).
"An interesting situation is created by the California conservation statute. Although
it contains no express reference to correlative rights, interpretation of the provisions
preventing "unreasonable waste" indicates that its primary purpose is to protect
correlative rights. See People v. Associated Oil Co., supra note 44, and Bandini
Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court., supra note 44. Also see Ely, supra note 1.
"SFor a brief history of the developmental period see Conservation of Oil and Gas,
A Legal History, 1948, SECTION OF MINERAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
300-309 (1949).
"Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Legal History, 1958 SECTION OF MINERAL LAW,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 136 (1960).
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correlative rights.50 It has already been noted that correlative rights can
be protected even in the absence of express statutory authority if such
is the intent of the legislature.51 However, Montana's legislation seems
to negate this possibility as a comparison with the model statute will
indicate.
The first indication of an intention to preclude recognition of cor-
relative rights is found in the Montana legislature's failure to adopt the
model statute's Declaration of Policy. Among other things, this statement
of policy provided for the "operation and development of oil and gas
properties in such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and
gas be had and that the correlative rights of all owners be fully pro-
tected .... "152 Whatever the legal effect of a policy declaration, it does
spell out the legislative purpose underlying the adoption of a particular
law. Consequently, this omission at least indicates that unlike many other
states, 53 protection of correlative rights is not an expressed policy reason
for the enactment of the Montana oil and gas conservation laws.
Another significant omission is found in the well spacing unit pro-
visions. Montana's legislation provides that the commission may estab-
lish a well spacing unit for a pool in order to "prevent or to assist in
preventing waste of oil or gas . . . .-54 The same section in the model
statute makes prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights
alternative bases for establishing a spacing unit.55 In a subdivision of
the well spacing provisions, the Montana statute allows the commission
to grant an exception whenever "the requirement to drill the well at the
authorized location in the spacing unit would be inequitable or unreason-
able." 56 The comparable section in the model statute would allow an
exception "to prevent the production from the spacing unit of more than
its just and equitable share of the oil and gas in the pool. '57 Finally,
modification of spacing orders in order to include additional areas is
allowed in Montana only to prevent waste, 58 whereas the model statute
accepts protection of correlative rights as a sufficient basis.5 9
Indicative of careful drafting, the differences in the well spacing
provisions show a definite scheme on the part of the Montana legislators
to exclude not only express recognition of correlative rights, but im-
plicit recognition as well. The words "correlative rights" are not used.
'Other differences include lack of a provision for compulsory unitization and failure
to allow "restriction of production according to reasonable market demand.
Id. at 137.
'See supra note 47.
52INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMIssIoN, A Form for an Oil and Gas Conservation
Statute, Declaration of Policy (hereafter cited as the MODEL ACT).
'Supra note 45.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 60-129(A).
'MODFL ACT § 5(A).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 60-129(C).
5
"MODEL ACT § 5(c).
-R.C.M. 1947 § 60-129(D).
"
9
MODEL ACT § 5(D).
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Modification of the area included in existing units may be had only if the
conservation agency is convinced that otherwise waste will result. In
other words, waste prevention is the sole criterion to be used by the oil
and gas commission in making its well spacing determinations.
The only provision upon which an argument for the existence of cor-
relative rights could be based is that granting an exception to the unit
in order to avoid "inequitable or unreasonable" results. This argument
was successfully made to the Montana Supreme Court in the case of
Pattie v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission."0
In the Pattie case, a petroleum company owned an oil and gas lease
adjacent to that held by petitioners. The petroleum company while drill-
ing for oil unexpectedly hit natural gas in commercial quantities. Since
the company's well had been spaced in conformity with the oil well
spacing regulations, the gas producing well was in violation of the gas
well spacing requirements. The petroleum company then petitioned the
Montana Oil and Gas Conservation Commission for an exception which
would allow the gas well to remain where it was originally drilled.
The petitioner also asked the Commission for an exception to the spacing
regulations. He showed the Commission that unless an offset well could
be drilled at a point closer to the petroleum company's boundaries than
permitted by the spacing orders, he would be unable to prevent the
drainage from beneath his land. 61 The Commission granted the petroleum
company's request and denied the petitioner's. The Commission justified
its decision on the ground that the Montana legislature had not given it
authority to determine correlative rights.
Petitioner brought an action against the Commission in district court
alleging that the Commission's order was "unreasonable and inequit-
able. '62 The district court sustained petitioner's contention by finding
that the Commission had the authority and duty to "adjudicate" cor-
relative rights. Thereupon the Commission appealed to the Montana
Supreme Court where the judgment against the Commission was af-
firmed.63
The Montana Supreme Court assumed that unless the conservation
legislation recognized private rights it would be unconstitutional.6 4
Since the legislation did not expressly mention these rights, 5 and be-
cause the court did not feel the legislation was unconstitutional, only one
conclusion remained. ". . . (C)onsideration of correlative rights and other
private rights of the landowners insofar as spacing and regulatory orders
10145 Mont. 531, 402 P.2d 596 (1965).611d at 598.
62Ibid.
63However, the decision of the lower court was qualified. The Montana Supreme
Court said that in the absence of explicit legislative direction, an agency could
not have the authority to exercise quasi-judicial functions. Therfore, the commis-
sion could not have the power to "adjudicate" correlative rights. "We modify
that to mean only that the Commission has the authority and duty to consider
correlative rights and private interests in making regulatory orders . . . . Id. at 601.
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and requirements are concerned is a power necessarily arising by impli-
cation from the legislation."6 6
One critical problem not considered by the Court was that of legis-
lative intent. The promoters of the 1953 legislation indicate that the con-
servation agency was not to consider correlative rights. In the words
of one of the promoters, "From the very outset, it was apparent that, if
an oil and gas conservation act were to be passed, it would have to be
• . .without a provision recognizing the right of the Commission to deter-
mine correlative rights."6 7 Although complete committee reports are un-
available, it would seem that the Pattie case achieved a result not con-
templated by the people responsible for Montana's Oil and Gas Conser-
vation Act. Considering the action of the Montana Supreme Court, the
question then is whether a state legislature can enact conservation legis-
lation which is designed to keep from the conservation agency any
authority to consider correlative rights
The power to enact conservation legislation is based on the assump-
tion that the state has an interest superior to that of any individual
landowner. The interest is superior in the sense that the state may make
regulatory measures as long as they are not arbitrary.68 In the area of oil
and gas, the test of arbitrariness is dependent on whether there is a
reasonable relation between the conservation measure and the dual ob-
jectives of conservation legislation. That is, whether waste is prevented
"Id. at 600. The court cited 1A SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS, § 106, n.44, (1954) as its
authority.
"The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court faced a similar problem
in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, supra note 37. The statute in that case was a waste
prevention statute with no reference to correlative rights, and yet in was the first
conservation measure to be sustained on a correlative rights basis.
6 Supra note 60, at 601.
7Letter from R. F. IHibbs, dated Oct. 28, 1966, to Sidney J. Strong. He also sug-
gests some of the reasons which required this position.
[B]efore the enactment of this statute, Montana had virtually no
statutes for the prevention of waste or the control of oil and gas fields
• . . [and] virtually all of the production in Montana had been through
small, independent, locally-owned producers. Their efforts had been
great and their rewards were meager. They were most apprehensive of
the encroachment of major oil companies into the area on the crest of
the boom which was then developing.
These small independent operators were, in many instances, hard to con-
vince that any governmental encroachment on their right to produce
was good. Many independents who had been in the production of oil in
other states were wary of the power that major oil companies can
exert . ...
Even without the insistence of the independent operators in 1953, I ques-
tion whether the inclusion in the Act of these two items in an area
which is undeveloped, would have been good. The independent oil com-
panies represent the group which is most apt to bring in new fields.
Such companies have a fear that they may not be able to produce suf-
ficiently to warrant the wildcatting which is necessary to start new
fields. Montana still needs to invite the independents.
Inquiries were sent to the five Montana Senators who introduced the 1953 con-
servation legislation. Reply was received from only three, but they were in agree-
ment as to the intentional exclusion of correlative rights from the purview of the
statute.
"See Bernstein v. Bush, 29 Cal.2d 773, 177 P.2d 913 (1947), Braly v. Board of Fire
Commissioners, 157 Cal App.2d 608, 321 P.2d 504 (1958).
[Vol. 28
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 28 [1966], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol28/iss2/3
NOTES
in order to promote the greatest ultimate economic recovery and protect
the correlative rights of adjoining owners over a common source of
supply.,9
However, legislation may be oriented toward only one of the objec-
tives. Some states, like Montana, prohibit waste so that there will be no
wasteful depletion of oil and gas as a natural resource.70 Other states,
like California, are niore concerned with protecting the property rights
of all the owners over a common source and thus, the purpose of waste
prevention is primarily for the protection of correlative rights. 71 But
regardless of their orientation, no state favors one of the dual objectives
to the complete exclusion of the other. And as the following will indi-
cate, such a conservation policy is not possible as the dual objectives are
inseparable.
As previously noted, Montana's conservation legislation is to a large
extent a typical example of legislation oriented toward waste preven-
tion. Beginning with an absolute prohibition of waste72 and followed by
a comprehensive statement of all those acts included within the defini-
tion of waste,73 the conservation statute proceeds to define all authority
of the oil and gas commission in terms of waste prevention.74 Illustrative
is the establishment of well spacing units75 and the provisions allowing
pooling of individual interests within the spacing unit. 76 Clearly the
import of the provisions, taken as a whole, is the desire to obtain the
greatest ultimate economic recovery of oil and gas. No consideration is
given to private property rights. And it is at this point that the Montana
statute departs from the usual waste prevention statute.
Typically waste prevention statutes prohibit the conservation agency
from adopting any policies amounting to confiscation. 77 As generally
understood, "Every owner or lessee is entitled to a fair chance to recover
the oil or gas in or under his land, or their equivalent in kind, and any
denial of such fair chance amounts to confiscation. 7'  Most often the
party claiming confiscation tries to obtain an exception to the well spac-
ing unit. Exceptions are granted owners of small tracts of land,79 when
the well is located on the end of the reservoir,80 or any type of uncom-
6 9SULLIVAN, OIL AND GAS LAW § 136 (1955).
"°Infra notes 72-76.
'For example see CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 3300 (1956), as interpreted by
Bandini Petroleum v. Superior Court, supra note 44, at 21-22.
72R.C.M. 1947, § 60-124.
73R.C.M. 1947, § 60-126.
71R.C.M. 1947, § 60-127.
75R.C.M. 1947, § 60-129.
6R.C.M. 1947, § 60-130.
'See for example TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6049c, § 7 (1962).
7'Marrs v. Railroad Com'n, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941, 948 (1944), and Railroad
Com'n v. De Bardeleben, 157 Tex. 518, 305 S.W.2d 141 (1957).
'Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Sears, (Tex Civ App), 362 S.W.2d 396 (1962).
SCrews v. Champlin Oil and Refining Co., Okla., 413 P.2d 508 (1966).
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pensated drainage.8 ' In at least Texas, once confiscation is established,
then an exception must be granted even though waste will result.8 2 The
place of correlative rights protection in waste prevention legislation is
that of "a necessary adjunct to the prevention of waste. Waste will re-
sult unless the Commission can also act to protect correlative rights."8 3
Therefore, correlative rights are protected only to the extent that waste
prevention is advanced.
The Montana Oil and Gas Commission is also authorized to grant
exceptions. The claimant is only required to show that the authorized
location is on the edge of the pool or for some other reason is "inequit-
able or unreasonable. 8s 4 Pooling arrangements must allow each pro-
ducer the opportunity to recover "his just and equitable share. '8 5 These
provisions seem ostensibly sufficient to prevent confiscation of property
and thus put Montana in line with the other waste prevention states. But
the Montana legislators did not intend the Commission to consider cor-
relative rights. And as the Pattie case indicated, the conservation agency
operated on this assumption. So a dilemma is created: Either follow
legislative intent and ignore the express language of the statute, or read
unintended meaning into the provisions.
Statutes preventing waste in order that correlative rights may be
better protected are generally very explicit. Statements of correlative
rights by means of policy declaration and comprehensive definitions have
already been noted.8 6 California appears to be the only exception. In
that state correlative rights' protection is not expressly mentioned. But
the waste provisions have been upheld as a reasonable means to protect
correlative rights.87 With express protection of private rights, the states
with extensive correlative rights provisions have no problem with con-
fiscation. The conservation agency is simply instructed to consider
private interests in all of its action. 8 Montana's conservation legislation
could not be classified as this type of statute.
8Railroad Com'n of Texas v. Texas Co., 298 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
Proving the exception raises other problems. "To justify an exception . . . it is
necessary to show that the conditions affecting the drainage of wells on a particular
tract are so peculiar, unusual and abnormal that it is removed from the same cate-
gory of the suirounding area to which the general rule applies." Wrather v.
Humble Oil and Refining Co., 147 Tex. 144, 214 S.W.2d 112, 117 (1948). See also
Railroad Com'n v. Shell Oil Co., 154 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), 139 Tex.
66, 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942).
'lMagnolia Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Com'n, 120 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Marrs v. Railroad Com'a, supra note 78; and Railroad Com'n v. De Bardeleben,
supra note 78.
But it will not be granted if the petitioner created the situation requiring the
exception. Tenneco Oil Co. v. State Industrial Com'n, 131 N.W.2d 722 (N.D. 1964).
Cf. Ryan Consolidated Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 211, 285 S.W.2d 201
(1956).
'Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Com'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
'Supra note 56.
MR.C.M. 1947, § 60-130(A).
"Supra note 45.
rSupra note 71.
I'Supra note 45.
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Nor can the provisions of the Montana legislation be interpreted as
being designed to protect correlative rights, even in the absence of waste.
Although the court in the Pattie case noted that the Montana statute was
a waste prevention statute, 9 it also cited the Ohio Oil Company case as
precedent for a judicial implication of correlative rights.9 0 It is true the
Ohio Oil Company case did determine that correlative rights were to be
protected by a waste prevention statute. But that did not answer the
question before the court. That is, did the conservation agency have the
authority to consider correlative rights? The Ohio Oil Company only said
that protection of correlative rights is a legitimate basis for exercise of
a state's police power. In the Pattie case, there was no question that the
state could validly enact conservation legislation. But could the state
legislature enact a type of conservation legislation which endorsed non-
recognition of private interests? The Montana court said no by implying
a legislative intent to protect correlative rights. Realistically, it does not
seem reasonable to imply that the Montana legislature used the legal
basis of correlative rights protection to sustain its enactment when in
fact, it intended not to protect these rights.
From this analysis, it is obvious that Montana legislation is neither
a waste prevention statute with safeguards against confiscation, nor does
it have provisions from which an implication of correlative rights pro-
tection can be made. The inevitable conclusion is that the legislation is
not a reasonable regulatory measure. Its sole purpose is to prevent waste
without regard to constitutional prohibitions against taking of property
without due process of law. Nevertheless, a declaration of unconstitu-
tionality was avoided by the Montana Supreme Court. Whether the de-
cision in the Pattie case is supportable is arguable, but at least Montana
has found a method of protecting correlative rights when none seemed to
exist.
Aside from the constitutional restrictions, there are also practical
reasons for questioning the wisdom of a law negating the consideration
of correlative rights' protection. According to the promoters of the legis-
lation, the purpose of the exclusion was to protect the interests of the
small independent producers. 9' It was feared that the small operators
scattered over a common source of supply would be forced to give up a
large portion of their production to the large leaseholders over the same
reservoir each time a spacing unit was created. But the Pattie case illus-
trates that correlative rights protection may also benefit the small pro-
ducer. In that case, if the Montana legislation had been given a literal
interpretation, the large oil company would have completely eliminated
the small producer. Certainly the guarantee that all owners over a com-
mon source of supply shall have an equal opportunity to drill for some
portion of the oil and gas in situ cannot be totally destructive of the
small owner's interest.
9Pattie v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, supra note 60, at 599-600.
9Ibid.
"lSupra note 67.
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It is strongly recommended that the Montana legislature note the
history of the New Mexico conservation legislation. New Mexico was
one of the first states to enact a "truly comprehensive conservation law"
and these 1935 provisions remain today substantially unchanged.9 2 How-
ever, until 1949 the legislation did not provide for the recognition of
correlative rights.9 3 Whether for fear of problems such as those created
by the present Montana legislation or because of a realization that cor-
relative rights' protection is a fundamental part of conservation legisla-
tion, adequate provision was finally made for these rights. Such an ap-
proach not only satisfies all constitutional requirements, but makes ex-
plicit what now in Montana is so vague.
Only a balancing of public and private interests can yield a satisfac-
tory result. The Montana legislature should not assume that the appro-
priate balance was created by the Pattie case. That case only serves to
point out the confusion inherent in the present legislation. It is therefore,
incumbent upon the legislature to recognize the need for a truly modern
comprehensive conservation statute. And as indicated, this requires an
express direction to the conservation agency to consider correlative rights
in making all its determinations. This is a necessity for Montana as one
of the major petroleum producing states.
SIDNEY J. STRONG.
"
2Morris, Compulsory Pooling of Oil and Gas Interests in New Mexico, 3 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 316 (1963-64).
"
3Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Legal History, 1958, supra note 49, at 155.
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